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The Limits of Sympathy: J. M. Coetzee’s 
Evolving Ethics of Engagement
Geoffrey Baker
“It helps to try to imagine ourselves into her argument”
(Linda Kintz Between Jesus 29)
I would like to open this article with two quotations: “Despite Thomas 
Nagel, who is probably a good man, despite Thomas Aquinas and René 
Descartes, with whom I have more diffi culty in sympathizing, there is 
no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of 
another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (Coetzee, 
The Lives of Animals 35); “We are invited to understand and sympathize. 
But there is a limit to sympathy. For though he lives among us, he is not 
one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, that is, a mon-
ster” (Coetzee, Disgrace 33–34). These brief passages from two of J.M. 
Coetzee’s texts, when placed in tandem and out of the context of the 
narrative developments in which they appear, form a neat little disagree-
ment, a paradox to which this paper’s attention will fi nally tend in its 
investigation of what one might term—whether or not one chooses to 
see it as superfi cial or essential—the affective aim of Coetzee’s fi ctions. 
Both quotes are taken from lectures delivered by fi ctional characters, 
and since both of these characters are academics and writers, the con-
trast at hand between these dueling viewpoints and how they come to be 
represented could reverberate forcefully within a larger discussion over 
the more general public role of the writer or intellectual, as well as of 
literature and the criticism of literature.
Certainly, no one can accuse Coetzee of having shied away from such 
issues during his career as a novelist and scholar; if one charges him with 
any crime, it is usually that of refusing to offer quick and easy prescrip-
tive solutions to the debate. In her assessment of Coetzee’s two most 
recent publications1—the Booker Prize-winning novel Disgrace (1999), 
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and The Lives of Animals (1999), the Tanner lectures Coetzee delivered 
at Princeton—Elizabeth Lowry asserts that “Disgrace is a deeply pessi-
mistic book. It may have made the Booker short-list [Lowry writes, of 
course, before the novel actually wins the Booker], but it will not win 
unqualifi ed praise from Coetzee’s more prescriptive critics in the South 
African literary establishment” (14). It is not diffi cult to imagine the 
average size and shape of the sternly prescriptivist criticism that Lowry 
predicts will be leveled at Coetzee, because we have seen it before, in the 
form of Mike Marais’ and Benita Parry’s somewhat reproachful critiques 
of Age of Iron (1990). I will explore the specifi cs of their trouble with 
Age of Iron later; suffi ce it to say, for the present, that Parry and Marais 
both maintain in these essays that Coetzee’s novels, because of their dis-
inclination to realist narrative modes and their willful contestation of 
any claim to positional authority, become mired in paradox and thus 
renounce the possibility of any movement toward real, practical, politi-
cal engagement.
Coetzee’s critics are both right and wrong, I believe, and it is around 
a charting of the strengths and limitations of their cases that this paper 
will organize itself. It is going perhaps too far to argue, as Parry and 
Marais have done, that Coetzee’s fi ction does not offer the option of 
any sort of practical engagement, and I do not exclusively mean the 
highly theoretical, deconstructive sort of pre-practical engagement 
whose presence in Coetzee’s novels has been profi tably formulated by 
Derek Attridge (in “Trusting the Other” and “Literary Form”), David 
Attwell, Barbara Eckstein, and Lance Olsen. In addition to this crucial 
attention to work at the level of the epistemological, one fi nds, at least 
in some of Coetzee’s more recent efforts (I will focus on Age of Iron and 
The Lives of Animals, and fi nally Disgrace) a mode of everyday engage-
ment that is at least offered for the reader’s consideration, even if it is not 
wholeheartedly sponsored by the text. While Parry and Marais have read 
all potential for practical engagement out of Coetzee’s novels, they are 
perfectly correct to hold that any tacit solutions lurking in the margins 
of his fi ctive works are ruthlessly complicated, to the point of near-total 
inadequacy. This paper will fi rst elaborate the disagreements between 
the prescriptivists and their challengers, pointing to possible theoretical 
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forebears of both sides of the debate, but focusing most concertedly on a 
political aesthetics that operates at the level of representation in the writ-
ings of theorists like Theodor Adorno and Jacques Derrida. My tracing 
of what one might call Coetzee’s middle road—a practical agenda for 
transformative action that occurs on a seemingly non-political plane, at 
sites of interpersonal sympathy—will satisfy neither his most ardently 
theory-grounded nor his most dogmatically prescriptivist critics.2 Yet, 
into whatever balance is established between the camps, this paper will 
fi nally adduce the very complexities that so frustrate these politically 
committed critics, points at which Coetzee’s impulse toward a sympa-
thetic ethics meets its limit; it is this limit itself that marks the bound-
aries of Coetzee’s formulation of the possibility for and the potency of 
both literary and practical engagement.
I. Unlimited Sympathy
The intellectual squabble over the practical potential of literature is at 
least as old as Plato’s Republic, but the shape of the argument has shifted 
drastically in the last few decades; it is certainly disingenuous today to 
believe that the aesthetic occupies a realm comfortably removed from 
the ethical or political, and dangerous to place the aesthetic above the 
ethical or political as a Julien Benda (La Trahison des clercs [1927]) or 
a Thomas Mann (Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen [Observations of 
an Unpolitical Man 1918]) might previously have done. Consider, for 
example, Fredric Jameson’s call to arms at the outset of The Political 
Unconscious, a book that “conceives of the political perspective not as 
some supplementary method . . . but rather as the absolute horizon of 
all reading and all interpretation” (17). “Everything,” Jameson has fa-
mously assured us, “is ‘in the last analysis’ political” (20). Despite his 
occasional early caution as regards fi gures like Derrida,3 Jameson’s place-
ment of the political at the center of all things literary is partially orga-
nized by the so-called linguistic turn, for if all springs from language, 
political action included, then media that set language into motion 
and put it under pressure (that work on language, as Moroccan author 
Tahar Ben Jelloun has said of Joyce’s writing [qtd. in Spear 34]) can 
and must be perceived as key players on the political stage. It may be 
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worthwhile at this point briefl y to characterize, then, the disagreement 
mentioned above over the ethical and political potential of Coetzee’s 
novels. Adorno, Derrida, and political thinker Rudolf Bahro will help to 
frame the discussion, as well as serve to move the subject immediately at 
hand—the discussion surrounding Coetzee’s narrative politics—quickly 
to what one must see as clear, almost prescriptive moments in Coetzee’s 
fi ctions, moments that seem to breathe best on a middle ground some-
where between the demand for prescribed social engagement on the one 
hand, and the call for attention to more elemental, pre-practical trans-
formation on the other.
Mike Marais concludes his article, “Places of Pigs: The Tension 
Between Implication and Transcendence in J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron 
and The Master of Petersburg,” with the following j’accuse :
In conclusion, then, one fi nds in Coetzee’s fi ction a minimal-
ist programme for prompting change which is, quite literally, 
undermined even as it is articulated. Convinced of the need for 
change in the society in which he writes but, at the same time, 
aware of the compromising nature of the ineluctable “worldli-
ness” of the literary text, this writer has had to choose between 
subsiding into silence and adopting a strategy of paradox. 
Premised as it is on this uneasy balance between knowledge of 
implication and hope for transcendence, this strategy can, at 
best, generate only “intimations” of an alternative to the status 
quo, intimations which are therefore often either overlooked or 
ignored. (94)
Paradox seems to insinuate itself strongly within even a glance at criti-
cal reconstructions of Coetzee’s “agenda.” Marais’ basic claim here is, 
of course, that Coetzee’s novels will never raise themselves to the regal 
status of collective calls to practical action, because they refuse, by virtue 
of their dabbling in paradox, to shout univocally and in a ruthlessly, 
propagandistically uncomplicated manner. Hence, their mere “intima-
tions” too often go unheard. In her dismissal of any possible affective 
power in Age of Iron Parry follows the same line of thought as Marais: 
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What I have attempted to suggest is how a fi ction which in its 
multivalence, formal inventiveness, and virtuoso self-interroga-
tion of narrative production and authority remains unmatched 
in South African writing, is marked by the further singularity 
of a textual practice which dissipates the engagement with po-
litical conditions it also inscribes. (164) 
Such distrust of the political power of paradox and of the experimental 
refusal of generic and formal comfort has a long history, of course. One 
could turn here to several sources, but Sartre’s Qu’est-ce que la littérature? 
seems the best place to start, not only because much current scholarship 
constantly makes him the barometer against which all other “commit-
ted” writers are measured,2 but also because Sartre is Adorno’s chosen 
theoretical adversary in his essay on “Commitment”; the anti-innova-
tion agenda that Adorno constructs in order to refute it is built solidly 
on Sartrean foundations.
I will only briefl y point to several moments of Sartre’s essay on en-
gaged literature that aptly highlight the aesthetic paradigm of critics 
such as Marais and Parry. His repeated haranguing of the surrealists, 
and especially of Breton, reveals Sartre at his most realist and most pre-
scriptive:
Si Breton croit pouvoir poursuivre ses expériences intérieures 
en marge de l’activité révolutionnaire et parallèlement à elle, il 
est condamné d’avance; car cela reviendrait à dire qu’une libéra-
tion de l’esprit est concevable dans les chaînes, au moins pour 
certains gens, et, par conséquent, à rendre la révolution moins 
urgente. . . . Cette expression métaphysique et abstraite de leur 
révolte est évidemment celle qu’ils choisissent de préférence. 
Seulement c’est aussi celle qui laisse le monde rigoureuse-
ment intact. . . . Ils en arrivent donc à souhaiter que d’autres 
se chargent, en marge de leurs expériences spirituelles, d’opérer 
par la force des destructions concrètes. (188–89, 190–91)
Sartre concludes that such “déclarations révolutionnaires demeurent 
purement théoriques,” and the implication of his critique is that the 
32
Geo f f r e y  Bak e r
theoretical and the really revolutionary—the practical—will always be 
at incompatible odds (192–93). Echoes of Sartrean political aesthetics 
abound in Marais’ and Parry’s doubt as to the effectiveness of Coetzee’s 
fi ction, which refuses, in Sartre’s words, to “prendre une position dans 
notre littérature” (276). For Sartre, of course, as for any prescriptivist 
reader, “la littérature est par essence prise de position,” unequivocally 
and positively.
On the opposing side of this ongoing exchange are Attwell and 
Attridge, whose defense of the political import of Coetzee’s interrogat-
ing authoritarian structures of representation strikes resolutely Adornian 
chords in its insistence on the necessity of an epistemological change, the 
very change that will in turn enable, perhaps even constitute, practical 
transformation. In Attwell’s response to Parry’s criticism of Age of Iron’s 
shortcomings in the arena of praxis, he makes it clear that Parry’s “ar-
gument’s purchase depends on the notion of a fairly simple correspon-
dence between the play of events in the narrative and the kind of social 
order that well-meaning people would like to see brought into being” 
(“Dialogue” 167). Attridge contextualizes this desire for what Attwell 
terms “a fairly simple correspondence” between narrative and praxis: 
The demand that the production and judgment of literature 
be governed by its immediate effectiveness in the struggle for 
change (or against change) has been immensely powerful, and 
has given rise to a suspicion of anything appearing hermetic, 
self-referential, formally inventive, or otherwise distant from 
the canons and procedures of the realist tradition. (“Literary 
Form” 243) 
Against this tradition, against the Sartrean conception of properly polit-
ical art as a dévoilement, an unveiling of the truth in whose presence no 
reader can remain uncommitted and disengaged, Attridge supports an 
attention to the manner in which novels can be effective “by interrupt-
ing or disturbing the discursive patterns in which we are at home”—that 
is, by operating at the primordial level that grounds or conditions (fol-
lowing the logic of the linguistic turn) practical action (250). One is 
reminded of modernism—or, rather, of caricatures of modernism—“as 
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being defi ned precisely by the avoidance of political responsibility, by 
the vaunting of an artistic autonomy that has little interest in modes of 
otherness in cultural and political life,” and of the fact that Coetzee’s 
two most acknowledged infl uences were those bastions of modernism, 
Kafka and Beckett (244–45).
Adorno, too, points to Kafka and Beckett as exemplars of a politi-
cal art that functions in the pre-political mode by calling into question 
the very epistemological structures that give birth to unsavory political 
or social formations such as National Socialism, or Apartheid (which, 
as Regina Janes recalls, was originally founded on a National Socialist 
model [108]). “Eulogists of relevance,” Adorno claims, “are more likely 
to fi nd Sartre’s Huis clos profound, than to listen patiently to a text whose 
language challenges signifi cation and by its very distance from mean-
ing revolts in advance against the positivist subordination of meaning” 
(“Commitment” 179). No, Adorno says, “committed art in the proper 
sense is not intended to generate ameliorative measures, legislative acts 
or practical institutions . . . but to work at the level of fundamental at-
titudes [Haltung]” (180). The “shock of the unintelligible” can and does 
communicate, according to Adorno. Indeed, Attridge has highlighted 
just such textual strategies in the overture to Age of Iron and “its largely 
paratactic and often verbless sequences,” in an almost Adornian fashion 
(“Literary Form” 251). Adorno, in his essay on Hölderlin’s fl outing of 
grammatical and syntactic normalcy, points to Hölderlin’s “artifi cial dis-
turbances that evade the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax” and 
unsettle “the category of meaning” (“Parataxis” 131, 136). The defense 
of the most formally innovative high modernism, like that of Kafka and 
Beckett, requires an appreciative understanding of unintelligibility and 
of the disruption of accepted interpretive practices, a disruption that ul-
timately reverberates within the political sphere, Adorno believes. In this 
spirit, it may be appropriate here to let Derrida have the last word before 
the discussion shifts more specifi cally to Coetzee’s novels:
I will simply add that it is not necessary to point to a fl esh-and-
blood example, or to write moralizing pamphlets demanding 
the exclusion of wicked parasites (those of language or of the 
34
Geo f f r e y  Bak e r
polis, the effects of the unconscious, the pharmakoi, people on 
welfare, nonconformists or spies) in order to speak an ethical-
political language or . . . to reproduce in a discourse said to be 
theoretical the founding categories of all ethical-political state-
ments. (96–97)
“Ethical-political” writing, Derrida contends in a very Jamesonian spirit, 
need not always appear in the form of ethical-political writing.
Attwell’s response to Parry’s indictment of Age of Iron pulls back a bit 
from a celebration of the “theoretical” accomplishments of the novel, in 
a way that leads nicely into what I believe is a middle road of ethical (in-
terpersonal, in Emmanuel Levinas’s understanding of it) possibility that 
Coetzee charts between prescriptions for action and acknowledgements 
that effective change must fi rst take place at a more fundamental level. 
Attwell points out that Age of Iron is not at all the deliberately anti-real-
ist continuation of Coetzee’s earlier novelistic project: “In Age of Iron it 
is quite different; here ethnographic and class differences are revealed in 
their specifi c detail. Far from being thematized as a rather inscrutable 
if compelling force, alterity is given a social destiny in the later novel” 
(“Dialogue” 168). The same certainly holds true for Disgrace.3 Cherry 
Clayton offers a similar assessment of Age of Iron, going so far as to in-
sinuate that Coetzee has slowly but surely withdrawn from the project 
of purely theoretical engagement:
In the trajectory of Coetzee’s fi ction, which in this respect has 
been opposite to Gordimer’s, he has not further problematized 
the historical subject but gradually granted it more power, just 
as he has gradually granted narrative—as opposed to meta-nar-
rative—more power, so that Age of Iron is the least interrupted 
and problematized of his narratives and is also cast in a most 
intimate familial form, a letter from mother to daughter. Mrs. 
Curren, unlike Magda in In the Heart of the Country, does not 
doubt her own ontological status. (163)
It is true that Coetzee’s more recent novels appear on the surface more 
realist and less theoretically challenging, perhaps by virtue of their great-
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er historical specifi city, but I think that Clayton pushes this further than 
one ought. Attridge’s essays on Age of Iron offer compelling evidence 
that Coetzee’s narrative has not become any less problematic, even if 
he does go so far as to narrate apparently realistic and historically situ-
ated human experience. Clayton, though, comes close to arguing that 
Coetzee has made the move to traditional modes of realist narrative. 
Attwell’s and Clayton’s notion is paramount here—the idea that Age of 
Iron represents a change in strategy for Coetzee—because it allows us 
to see that Elizabeth Curren’s lengthy and intimate epistle grits its teeth 
and takes a step further than Michael K. ’s narrator and the Magistrate 
of Waiting for the Barbarians, for example, are willing to go. The dif-
ference is that Age of Iron offers a solution, one that is not without its 
myriad complications but that surely casts itself as an option for prac-
tical—though not, perhaps, what one would term immediately politi-
cal—engagement: the exercise of interpersonal sympathy.4
Coetzee’s glances toward sympathy are analogous to Adorno’s politi-
cal aesthetics because both posit interior, theoretical transformation—
Adorno’s “fundamental attitudes”—as a necessary precursor to broad-
based cultural and political reformation. Whether Coetzee can ultimate-
ly trust in sympathy as a real, workable answer is another story, and will 
fi gure in the discussion of Disgrace later. In the interest of keeping this 
methodology from being articulated solely from within the academy, 
it may be intriguing to consider also the writings of Rudolf Bahro, a 
German Green Party founding member, who corroborates the Adornian 
claim that societal change must be initiated at a fundamental level, a 
level that Bahro terms “spiritual.” The goal, rather than acting “superfi -
cially—in a merely political way”5 is to “produce the soil of a different 
culture, a culture of peace,” by returning “to those strata of conscious-
ness which are traditionally described as religious” (86–88). For Bahro, 
this entails retreat-centered forms of communitarianism that eschew 
any sort of “repressive monotheistic” organized religion but that provide 
an arena for personal and local betterment that will reverberate within 
the larger community outside, a local ethics that forces a global poli-
tics (89). For Elizabeth Curren, as for Elizabeth Costello in The Lives of 
Animals, it entails the pursuit of a lifestyle based on sympathy, wherein 
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one transforms oneself by moving outside of oneself and into the shoes 
of another, and, for both of these characters, the quest slips into the 
language of the “soul,” a vocabulary, in Bahro’s words, “traditionally de-
scribed as religious.”
Because the turn toward sympathy occurs in quite explicit and imme-
diate fashion in The Lives of Animals, it will serve as a beginning from 
which Elizabeth Costello’s words can then be read retrogressively into 
Elizabeth Curren’s situation in Age of Iron, and one can start by reiter-
ating the second epigraph from this paper’s commencement: “Despite 
Thomas Nagel, who is probably a good man, despite Thomas Aquinas 
and René Descartes, with whom I have more diffi culty in sympathiz-
ing, there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into 
the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagina-
tion” (35). Elizabeth Costello’s lecture on the mistreatment of animals 
does little to convince her son or his wife of the validity of a sympathy 
that extends itself to include even non-humans, beings whose right to 
human sympathy has for centuries been rationalized away. The reluc-
tance to envision animal suffering on par with the suffering of human 
beings is exemplifi ed by the Holocaust survivor Abraham Stern’s reac-
tion to Elizabeth Costello’s lecture; Stern bristles at the stockyard/con-
centration-camp parity invoked by Costello. Amy Gutmann, in her in-
troduction to The Lives of Animals, rightly contextualizes this confl ict 
as a sympathetic impasse, an inability for both Stern and Costello to 
envision themselves in each other’s mindsets. When Costello is asked, 
though, by the president of the university hosting her lectures, whether 
her vegetarianism “comes out of moral conviction,” she responds in a 
way familiar to those who have read Age of Iron: “It comes out of a desire 
to save my soul” (43). Mrs. Curren, in the earlier novel, answers the un-
asked question in the same way, claiming that she is “trying to keep a 
soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul,” and that she “want[s] to 
be saved. How shall I be saved?” (130, 136).
The language of salvation upon which Mrs. Curren leans to express 
her notion of self-transformation is decidedly religious, a fact that per-
haps recalls us to Bahro’s insistence on the suitability of such transcen-
dental models of self-transformation to enable broader immanent, polit-
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ical and social reform. That the object to be changed fi rst is the speaking 
subject, the self, is highlighted in The Lives of Animals by an exchange 
between Mrs. Costello and her son:
“Do you really believe, Mother, that poetry classes are going to 
close down the slaughterhouses?”
“No.”
“Then why do it? . . . .Wasn’t your point about talk that it 
changes nothing? It seems to me that the level of behavior 
[Adorno’s “fundamental attitudes,” perhaps?] you want to change 
is too elementary, too elemental, to be reached by talk.” (58)
Mrs. Costello’s answer is a long time coming, but it runs as follows: “I 
just don’t want to sit silent” (59). She later acknowledges that her words 
will not “bring home to you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintel-
lectual nature, of that animal being”; clearly, her desire to speak har-
bours no illusions that her words will directly affect the world, and so it 
seems that, along the way to saving her soul, she is focussing rather on 
changing her self. The “sympathetic imagination”—probably the same 
thing that Taylor, in her review of Disgrace, christens “imaginative iden-
tifi cation” (25)—stands in The Lives of Animals as an alternative to the 
ontology of the stockyards, as a possible means of self-transformation.
Elizabeth Curren would concur with Mrs. Costello’s opening of the 
boundaries of sympathy, even to beings whose otherness stands in the 
way of one’s ready sympathy; this, she would suggest, is precisely where 
the extension of sympathy is most required. Curren fi rst overcomes her 
aversion to the vagabond lodger, Vercueil—“Because I cannot trust 
Vercueil I must trust him” (130)—then to the youthful African activ-
ist/militant, John—“I must love . . . the unlovable. I must love, for in-
stance, this child. Not bright little Bheki, but this one. He is here for a 
reason….I must love him. But I do not love him” (136). Later, however, 
Mrs. Curren speaks differently of John, and although it is never emphat-
ically phrased as “love,” it is embedded in language that clearly speaks to 
the essence of sympathy, to the sym in sympathy, the com in compassion, 
the with: “I want to tell you that, despite my dislike of him, he is with me 
more clearly, more piercingly than Bheki has ever been. He is with me or 
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I am with him” (175, emphases mine). She even retraces the moment of 
his death, situating herself within it, and within him: “He is listening to 
the murmur of the voices outside, and I listen with him” (175).
It would be misleading, though, to believe Mrs. Curren without sym-
pathy until the novel’s end, for she pinpoints early on a mode of sym-
pathetic relation that reintroduces a concern to which I alluded at the 
outset of this paper: the role of intellectual and authorial labor at this el-
emental level. “Six pages already,” she writes to her expatriated daughter 
in America, “and all about a man you have never met and never will. Why 
do I write about him? Because he is and is not I. Because in the look he 
gives me I see myself in a way that can be written” (9). Attwell is prob-
ably alluding to this passage when he states that “Mrs Curren is capable 
not only of refusing to see the other as non-human, but also of read-
ing herself through those whom she is disinclined to love” (170). This 
must be pushed further, however, for she not only reads herself through 
the other, but writes herself as well, constructs her own self through the 
other. And if writing—or at least the writerly imagination—becomes an 
integral part of the sympathetic mode for Mrs. Curren, it is pinpointed 
even more specifi cally by Elizabeth Costello, immediately following the 
passage that I have already cited, her assurance to us that “there are no 
limits to the sympathetic imagination”:
If you want proof [that there are no limits to the sympathetic 
imagination], consider the following. Some years ago I wrote a 
book called The House on Eccles Street. To write that book I had 
to think my way into the existence of Marion Bloom. Either 
I succeeded or I did not. If I did not, I cannot imagine why 
you invited me here today. In any event, the point is, Marion 
Bloom never existed. Marion Bloom was a fi gment of James 
Joyce’s imagination. If I can think my way into the existence of 
a being who has never existed, then I can think my way into the 
existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with 
whom I share the substrate of life. (35)
One’s own literary imagination, Mrs. Costello maintains, can serve as 
both a means of cultivating or realizing sympathy within oneself, and 
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may even provide a tool for breeding sympathy in others, in readers. 
After admitting the poverty of her own lecture’s language and its im-
potence to convince her audience, she counsels them “to read the poets 
who return the living, electric being to language” (65). Short of that, 
she says, one can always strive for sympathy by walking, “fl ank to fl ank, 
beside the beast that is prodded down the chute to his executioner.”6 
Elizabeth Curren dramatizes the sympathetic reach of the writer’s imagi-
nation as she envisions herself beside John, at the moment of his death; 
while the young boy waits with eyes open, Mrs. Curren’s are closed, as 
they must be to highlight that it is precisely the imagination that con-
structs this scenario. She also places the act of writing on a quite practi-
cal—almost corporeal—plane, one that seemingly links Mrs. Costello’s 
very physical example of walking “fl ank to fl ank” with the beasts, with 
the sympathy inherent in the process of literary writing. Age of Iron as 
a novel is nothing if not a fi ction generated by a body, by Elizabeth 
Curren’s dying body; she writes to her daughter, in the seeming tone of 
an apology, “This was never meant to be the story of a body, but of the 
soul it houses,” an admission that the novel is, in fact, the “story of a 
body” (185). This immediately precedes her account of “the story . . . of 
how [Vercueil] lost his fi ngers. . . . I always knew he had a story to tell, 
and now he begins to tell it, starting with the fi ngers of one hand” (186–
87). It is the fl esh of Vercueil’s human hand that begets the story he re-
lates to the narrator, and the two bodies of the vagabond and the novel’s 
narrator become “folded one upon the other like a page folded in two” 
(189). Fiction-writing, which opens the limitless sympathetic imagina-
tion, begins with the very real, practical physicality of the human body 
and the damage it sustains.
It would certainly be going too far to contend that these two works 
of Coetzee’s sponsor, overtly and in an uncomplicated manner, a move-
ment toward sympathy as a means of self-transformation. However, the 
option is presented, and given, in Age of Iron, a largely sympathetic treat-
ment. When Elizabeth Curren and Elizabeth Costello speak together, 
Coetzee’s case for sympathy is strengthened, along with the role of in-
tellectual endeavor and the fi ctive imagination in the equation. How 
does, or can, this change of personal Haltung work, though, as a strategy 
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for social progress, for widespread change? Age of Iron and The Lives of 
Animals both seem unprepared to answer this question in too optimistic 
a way, and with good reason; by the end of both works, it is unclear that 
anything has been changed. Any complications that arise in these two 
fi ctions, though, are aired even more powerfully in Disgrace.
II. The Limits of Sympathy
In many ways, the problem of sympathy can be read as perhaps the cen-
tral organizing concern of Coetzee’s Disgrace. The passage that I have 
already cited at the outset of this paper introduces the issue starkly into 
the novel’s narrative, and highlights the demands of alterity that call for 
one’s sympathy: “We are invited to understand and sympathize. But 
there is a limit to sympathy. For though he lives among us, he is not 
one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, that is, a mon-
ster” (33–34).7 David Lurie’s opinion on the power of sympathy in an 
explicitly literary context runs counter to that of Elizabeth Costello, but 
the fact that the language that he employs to contradict her so closely 
matches her own only calls one’s attention to what seems an ongoing 
debate within Coetzee’s recent œuvre. And just as Lurie begins by throw-
ing a spanner into the works of Mrs. Costello’s not entirely unblemished 
proclamations on the sympathetic imagination, Disgrace depicts sym-
pathy at its most troubled. This becomes clearer if, in reading Disgrace, 
one chronicles Lurie’s anti-sympathetic beginnings in the narrative and 
charts his progress as he transforms himself by the novel’s end, an end 
which forces the entry of various complexities into the novel’s under-
standing of sympathy and its power to improve anything. Asked another 
way, precisely how sympathetic is Coetzee’s treatment of the sympathy 
that David Lurie seems to enact in the novel’s fi nal pages?
From the outset, Lurie’s emotional engagement with others is suspect, 
probably even absent. (One must recognize that it is specifi cally an emo-
tional engagement at stake in relations of sympathy. Elizabeth Costello 
in The Lives of Animals speaks to the “unintellectual nature” [59].) The 
narrator categorizes Lurie’s interaction with Soraya, the prostitute that 
he sees regularly in his efforts to solve what he rather intellectually terms 
“the problem of sex,” as a relationship based not on Lurie’s relation to 
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the object of his desire, but rather on an act—almost a violent one—of 
apprehension: “Because he takes pleasure in her, because his pleasure is 
unfailing, an affection has grown up in him for her” (1–2). Lurie’s af-
fection for Soraya follows simply from what he takes from her, but his 
disinclination to sympathy is named even more specifi cally during the 
relating of his fi rst encounter with her. “The fi rst time Soraya received 
him,” the narrator explains, “she wore vermilion lipstick and heavy eye 
shadow. Not liking the stickiness of the makeup, he asked her to wipe 
it off. She obeyed, and has never worn it since. A ready learner, compli-
ant, pliant” (5). The last sentence of the passage captures in a tidy trick 
of language the lack of sympathy in Lurie’s associations with Soraya, for 
the prefi x com is sharply dropped, as if the sym in sympathy, and with 
it any real togetherness or interpersonal connection, were disappearing 
before the reader’s eyes.
Lurie’s direction changes when he quits Cape Town for the home of 
his daughter, Lucy, near Grahamstown. The narrator points out that 
this farmhouse was once home to a commune to which Lucy belonged; 
the commune, however, has moved on to New Bethesda, while Lucy 
has elected to stay in Salem. That Lucy’s friends have taken themselves 
to a place named after a Biblical site of healing perhaps indicates that 
Lucy’s home is not quite such a place, and the narrative seems to bear 
this out, as it quickly becomes a locus of suffering. It hardly requires 
mentioning, though, that there can be no sympathy without suffering 
(without pathos8) on someone’s part, no compassion without passion, 
and Coetzee’s novel enacts this soon after Lurie’s arrival at Lucy’s place. 
For the fi rst time, “he hears [his whole tirade] through another’s ears” 
and realizes that it “sounds melodramatic, excessive” (66). Soon after-
ward, he is introduced to the dogs for which Lucy cares, in a moment 
that will resound throughout the rest of the novel for its alertness to the 
otherness of animals that becomes a central theme of Disgrace. In an 
unguarded gesture, “he squats down, tickles [the bulldog bitch] behind 
the ears. ‘Abandoned, are we?’ he murmurs,” lightly employing a plural 
fi rst-person pronoun that joins him to the dog (78).9 Following Lucy’s 
rape at the hands of three strangers, Lurie explicitly ponders the limits 
of his own sympathy, and touches on another type of alterity with which 
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he is at an obvious loss for means of real relation: women. Replaying his 
worst nightmares of Lucy’s rape, he fi nds it easier—at least possible—
to place himself in the position of the rapists than he does to envision 
himself suffering along with his own daughter: “Lucy’s intuition is right 
after all: he does understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses him-
self, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fi ll them with the ghost of him-
self. The question is, does he have it in him to be the woman?” (160). 
That is indeed the question: does he have a sympathetic imagination 
potent enough?
It is curious that Lurie comes around to asking himself this question in 
the fi rst place, that he takes any interest at all in his powers of sympathy. 
One cannot help but relate this sudden introspection, though, to anoth-
er moment at which he interrogates the boundaries of his sympathetic 
imagination, during a long discussion over his motivation and reason 
for painstakingly caring for the corpses of the dogs that veterinarian Bev 
Shaw has had to put down to control the animal over-population of the 
area and stem the tide of animal suffering. He initially denies that he 
performs this service “for the sake of the dogs,” concluding that it must 
be “for himself ” (146). The language the narrator uses to describe his 
association with the animals, however, closely mirrors that of Elizabeth 
Costello in her defense of the limitless sympathetic imagination; it is in 
the clinic that “he enters their lives,” as if, in Costello’s words, “thinking 
himself into the being of another” (Disgrace 146; Lives 35). His conclu-
sion that he performs these acts of post-mortem kindness for himself, 
and because there is nobody else “stupid enough” to do it, speaks to a 
later moment in the novel, when he considers Lucy’s admonishing him 
to “be a good person”: “A good person. Not a bad resolution to make, 
in dark times” (216). The sentiment here recalls again Bahro’s call for 
individual efforts at self-transformation as a means of ultimately illu-
minating these “dark times.” From Lurie’s lips, the tone is resigned, but 
resignedly willing; it is a design to which he seems open.
What does one make, then, of Bev’s offi ce, the site that seems to in-
spire in Lurie an instinct for sympathy, for what he later is able to refer to 
as “love”? The clinic, “this bleak building is not a place of healing—her 
doctoring is too amateurish for that—but of last resort” (84). Bev’s clinic 
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discovers, at this textual moment, an affi nity with Elizabeth Curren’s 
pen in Age of Iron, which she mournfully refers to as the “weapon of 
last resort” (53); I have already attempted to demonstrate the manner 
in which Elizabeth Curren seems to corroborate Elizabeth Costello’s el-
evation of the writerly imagination and the act of writing to the level 
of sympathy. Bev’s clinic, though, is far more complicated than Mrs. 
Costello’s straightforward formulation of the sympathetic potential of 
the fi ctive imagination, for despite its situation at the center of Lurie’s 
discovery of love and sympathy, Coetzee gives to the weekly act of eu-
thanasia a name with disturbing and shamelessly unconcealed historical 
resonance: Lösung, or solution, which must invoke the Nazis’ Endlösung, 
or Final Solution. David Lurie learns to give “love” (a word he settles on 
only with great diffi culty) to the alterity of the animals, but he describes 
the moment of that love in the following manner, equal parts moving 
and disturbing:
He can save the young dog, if he wishes, for another week. But 
a time must come, it cannot be evaded, when he will have to 
bring him to Bev Shaw in her operating room (perhaps he will 
carry him in his arms, perhaps he will do that for him) and 
caress him and brush back the fur so that the needle can fi nd 
the vein, and whisper to him and support him in the moment 
when, bewilderingly, his legs buckle; and then, when the soul 
is out, fold him up and pack him away in his bag, and the next 
day wheel the bag into the fl ames and see that it is burnt, burnt 
up. He will do all that for him when the time comes. It will be 
little enough, less than little: nothing. (219–20)
What is one to think of a sympathy, of a love, whose resolution is a 
merciful murder, whose gift is death? Coetzee refuses to deliver into his 
readers’ hands and heart a single-minded, unproblematized strategy for 
social betterment.
This is not even to mention the complications that arise when a nar-
rative that probes the diffi culty and redemption in having sympathy 
for the animals, consistently dissolves the conceptual difference that 
separates humans from animals. Two prime examples will suffi ce, tex-
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tual instances of equation between animals and people. Lurie’s student 
Melanie Isaacs, for example, submits to the likely unwanted and unwar-
ranted advances of her professor, “like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox 
close on its neck” (25); the reporters, following the inquest into Lurie’s 
behavior toward Melanie Isaacs, “circle around him like hunters who 
have cornered a strange beast and do not know how to fi nish it off ” 
(56); and Laurie objects to Bev’s truncated nickname because “it re-
minds [him] of cattle” (79). Not to be unfair, Coetzee ensures that it is 
not always humans who are compared to animals, but also animals who 
are humanized, as when a woman in Bev’s clinic refers to her goat in 
human terms, saying, “Five hundred rand you pay for a man like him” 
(82). Does Coetzee’s narrative erase a good measure of the potential 
of sympathy for the animals by continually eroding the difference be-
tween the subjects and objects in this sympathetic relation, by animal-
izing the actions of men and humanizing the animals? When the degree 
of alterity to which the animal kingdom lays claim is degraded by con-
stant comparison to the human world, the overall punch and power of 
human sympathy toward the lives of animal others is weakened, and it 
is on this particular sympathy that the novel stakes the larger and more 
general case for sympathy. Elizabeth Costello’s seemingly visionary proc-
lamations on a sympathetic imagination without limits lie somewhat 
tarnished in the incinerator afterglow of Disgrace.
III. Conclusion
In the debate over Coetzee’s political effi cacy—between, on the one side, 
the Sartrean prescriptivists who demand a mimetic realism accompanied 
by a clear call to arms, an uncomplicated recommendation for practical, 
political action, and, on the other side of the disagreement, the heirs to 
Derrida and Adorno who believe that the most effective literature op-
erates at far more fundamental a level than that of immediate, tangible 
politics, that works, rather, at the level at which meaning and the struc-
tures of meaning that inform political praxis take shape—it is perhaps 
not going too far to suggest that Coetzee would side with the latter. He 
has argued that the desire for a realist portrayal of quick and simple so-
lutions to complex social and political quandries has mired the South 
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African writer in “a situation in which his art, no matter how well-inten-
tioned, is—and here we must be honest—too slow, too old-fashioned, 
too indirect to have any but the slightest and most belated effect on 
the life of the community or the course of history” (Doubling 98–99). 
Building from Adorno’s belief that properly politically effective literature 
must work at the level of Haltung, of fundamental attitudes and behav-
ior, I have attempted here to isolate a trend in Coetzee’s recent fi ction, 
which, when pieced together from Age of Iron, The Lives of Animals, and 
Disgrace, begins to resemble the revelation of a practical option for his 
readers. Coetzee’s thematization of sympathy operates, then, somewhere 
between the prescriptivist call for political action and the Derridean/
Adornian notion of transformation in the epistemological realm and 
as a necessary herald of practical change. Tempering the enthusiasm of 
Elizabeth Costello’s belief in the boundless powers of the sympathetic 
imagination, however, Disgrace unrepentantly troubles a discourse of 
sympatheticism that is tacitly constructed in the previous works.
If it is true that, as Clayton has argued, “the project of [Coetzee’s] 
fi ction has been to explore the diffi culties of any such gesture [toward 
representative committed action] in South Africa,” then certainly the 
treatment of sympathy in Disgrace is just such an exploration of diffi -
culties (154). And Frank Schulze-Engler, in an article mapping the lit-
erary project of creating civil society in South Africa, holds paramount 
the creation of “conditions of possibility rather than [the] furthering of 
particular political or cultural agendas” (35). Despite the reservations of 
Elizabeth Lowry in her review of Disgrace, the novel’s tendency to dis-
turb its own waters, to trouble its own exploration of sympathy, should 
not be surprising, even to the prescriptivist camp, for the political value 
and purpose of such an open-ended narrative (one that refuses to fi x its 
solutions and refuses blithely to answer the very questions it poses) has 
already been approached in Coetzee’s work by Age of Iron’s Mrs. Curren. 
In a blunt appraisal of her American grandchildren and their charmed 
lives, she recalls a photo of them in canoes, orange fl oaties attached to 
each arm to prevent their drowning, and laments the fact that these boys 
will fl oat through life uncomplicated: “Perhaps it dispirits me that your 
children will never drown. . . . If by some mischance they ever tip out of 
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their canoe, they will bob safely in the water, supported by their bright 
orange wings, till a motorboat comes to pick them up and bear them 
off and all is well again” (195). She prizes and requires, on the contrary, 
the complication and the suffering—the pathos—of harshly lived expe-
rience. Likewise Coetzee’s novels deny their readers the validating deus 
ex machina of the motorboat, the comfort and safety of bright orange 
wings.
Notes
1 I am, of course, excepting the memoir, Youth (2002), from this list, as well as the 
novel, Elizabeth Costello (2003), although it would have been perfectly apposite 
here, for reasons that will become obvious. Hopefully, the Elizabeth Costello of 
The Lives of Animals can represent her novel-length corollary.
2 See, for example, Denis (esp. 265–99), which, despite its pretensions to histori-
cal sweep, uses blatantly Sartrean criteria to assess each writer treated; Winock; 
Boschetti, for whom Sartre’s engagement is a “domination sur tous les fronts” 
(315); and Ory and Sirinelli. I give a more skeptical overview of Sartre’s lingering 
infl uence in my “Pressing Engagement” (71–78). Jameson, too, is cautious in his 
praise of Sartre in Marxism and Form, and in his earlier Sartre: The Origins of a 
Style.
3 See Poyner for a convincing example of how well this novel can be linked to 
political reality.
4 It could be argued that Life & Times of Michael K’s closing passage, with its 
teaspoon and string, also functions as an offered solution. Regina Janes’ careful 
reading of this passage asserts convincingly, however, that the “concluding af-
fi rmation: ‘one can live’” is “carefully guarded and hedged” and not to be taken 
seriously—but rather comically—as a legitimate answer to the more local ques-
tions posed by Michael’s story (116–18).
5 Statements like this have earned Bahro the suspicion of his more practical critics, 
who have, in a very Sartrean fashion, accused him of withdrawal and quietism, 
as when an interviewer for Lower Saxony’s Grüne Information wryly asked him, 
“How are we to count on these happy people [those who have decided to opt 
for less visibly practical modes of transformation]?” (Bahro 110). I am indebted 
here to John McClure—who fi rst pointed me to Bahro’s political essays—and 
his Late Imperial Romance (182).
6 While the purpose of the similarity eludes me, I am struck here by how close 
Coetzee’s language is here to that of the narrator of Karl Philipp Moritz’ Anton 
Reiser (1785–90): “Thenceforth, whenever [Anton] saw an animal being slaugh-
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tered, he always compared himself to it mentally. . . . He would often stand for 
hours staring at a calf, with head, eyes, ears, mouth, and nose, . . . often in the 
foolish delusion that he might gradually manage to think himself into the being 
of such an animal” (183). As Moritz’ narrator proceeds to speak of sympathy for 
dogs—a crux of Coetzee’s Disgrace—the parity becomes even clearer.
7 This piece of Lurie’s lecture could of course be adduced with regard to Lurie 
himself and his status, perhaps, in the eyes of the reader of Disgrace, who might 
fi nd it diffi cult at times to fi nd Lurie a sympathetic character at all—a fact that 
makes one wonder whether Coetzee is deliberately provoking if not outright 
testing his audience’s sympathetic limits.
8 Depending on the context, the Greek παθος can denote a range of things, ac-
cording to Liddell and Scott’s lexicon: “that which happens to a person or thing”; 
experience, be it good or bad; “calamity”; and “emotion” (1285–86).
9 Throughout this paper, I have made fairly liberal and uncritical use of the term 
“interpersonal,” and this may be a good point at which to become less uncriti-
cal, for the term seems to exclude the very animals toward which Lurie learns to 
direct his sympathy. The word “humane” (Lives 64, for example) seems equally 
suspect, as if to treat anything with respect—humanely—were to treat it either 
as a human or as a human would treat another human. Such terms remind one 
of how inadequate our very vocabulary is for dealing with our relationship to 
animals.
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